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THE EXTENSION OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
TO CORPORATE ASSET TRANSFEREESAN ASSAULT ON ANOTHER CITADEL
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the initial adoption of the rule of strict liability in tort,'
California has considered itself a leader in the development and extension of this area of the law.2 This development has been predicated
upon the public policies of shifting the costs of product-related injuries
from the consumer to the manufacturer who is better able to bear those
costs.3

A conflict of policies arises, however, when a transferee of corporate
assets is sued under the theory of strict liability for injuries sustained
from a transferor's product subsequent to the transfer and the transferor's dissolution. While the courts have employed a number of tests4
to determine a transferee's or successor's liability for its transferor's
torts, all have been those traditional corporate tests designed before the
adoption of strict liability and used primarily to protect business creditors
or shelter corporate transferees from unassumed liabilitiesY As a result
of applying these traditional tests, there has been a clash between the
policies underlying strict liability and those supporting predictability
in corporate transactions, with the courts until very recently consistently
6
protecting the corporate interests.
Recent decisions addressing this issue should serve as a warning to
business transferees because they strongly suggest a departure from the
1. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963). Greenman held that "a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an
article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for
defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." Id. at 62, 377
P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
2. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 474, 467 P.2d 229, 235, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 629, 635 (1970).
3. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
4. See text accompanying notes 55 & 56 infra.
5. See generally W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS,
§§ 7122-7123 (rev. perm. ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as FLETCHER].
6. See, e.g., Adams v. General Dynamics Corp., 405 F. Supp. 1020 (N.D. Cal. 1975);
Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Kloberdanz v. Joy
Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968) (applying California law); Ortiz v. South
Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1975).
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corporate rules once so strictly followed in determining a transferee's
liability for its transferor's torts. Some of these courts have modified
or extended the corporate rules to better align them with the public
policy underlying strict liability.7 On the other hand, the California
Supreme Court has gone so far as to flatly reject the use of such rules
in particular circumstances in favor of implementing the theory of strict
enterprise liability."
Through an examination of the competing policies underlying the
law of corporate transactions and those of strict liability in tort as they
have been developed in the decisional law, this Comment seeks to
determine where the California courts presently stand on the issue of
transferee liability, and to suggest the direction in which they are
headed.

II.

METHOD OF CORPORATE ACQUISITION AS DETERMINATIVE
OF ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITIESTHE TRADITIONAL APPROACH

A.

Law and Policy Governing CorporateAcquisitions

There are three basic methods by which corporate ownership of a
business enterprise may be transferred: (1) statutory merger or consolidation; (2) the sale of stock by the stockholders of the transferor
corporation to the transferee corporation; or (3) the purchase of the
assets of the transferor corporation by the transferee corporationY The
particular method a corporation will choose is dictated by the factual
setting, and generally two principal factors are of prime importance.
The first is the extent of statutory formality ° which must be complied
with in each case. The second and most compelling factor is the differing extent to which the transferee must assume the transferor's liabilities."
7. Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 965 (1975); Cyr. v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974); Shannon
v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
8. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
9. Orlanski, The Avoidance of the Assumption of Liabilities in "Stock for Assets"

Acquisitions, 45 L.A.B. BULL. 361-62 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Orlanski].
10. Statutory references are made to the new California General Corporation Law
which took effect on January 1, 1977. Law of Sept. 12, 1975, ch. 682, § 7, [1975]
Cal. Stat. 1516. The relevant sections are cited to CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. (West 1977).
11. Another factor of significance which influences a corporation's choice is the tax
consequences. See generally B. BirTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ch. 14 (3d ed. Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
B1TrKER

& EUSTICE].
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1. Merger and Consolidation
Corporate reorganizations by means of merger or consolidation are
subject to a number of special statutory procedures and requirements
which have recently have been made identical. 1 2 Despite this equal
statutory treatment, the two processes are distinguishable in the decisional law.
A statutory merger'3 involves the absorption of one corporation by
another through the acquisition of all its outstanding stock. The acquiring corporation thereby obtains the capital, franchises, and powers of the
merged corporation, with the former retaining its corporate identity and
the latter ceasing to exist as an entity. 1 4 In a consolidation, two or more
corporations unite their rights, franchises, privileges and property to
create a new corporation thereby dissolving the two constituent corporations.' 5
The statutory requirements with which merging or consolidating
companies must comply were designed to protect the rights of both
creditors and minority shareholders.16 The concern for minority shareholders is reflected in California's requirement that a plan for merger
or consolidation be approved by a majority of the outstanding shares
of each class of shareholders representing each constituent corpora12. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. §§ 1100-11 (West 1977). In addition to the provisions of chapter 11, mergers are regulated by the provisions of chapter 12 which apply
to corporate reorganizations. The new code eliminates any reference to consolidations,
apparently treating them as a merger.
13. A statutory merger should be distinguished from a de facto merger. A de facto
merger is a transaction structured as a sale but deemed by a court to be so similar
in effect to a merger as to warrant its subjection to the same procedural requirements
and legal consequences as a merger. See text accompanying notes 75-81 infra.
14. Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975) (citing FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 7041); Heating Equip.
Mfg. Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 228 Cal. App. 2d 290, 302, 39 Cal. Rptr. 453, 460
(1964).
15. See Jackson v. Continental Tel. Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 510, 513-14, 28 Cal. Rptr.
1, 3 (1963); Orlanski, supra note 9, at 362 n.3. If the shareholders receive only voting
stock of the surviving or new corporation, the transaction will qualify as a Type "A"
reorganization and will enjoy tax-free status. I.R.C. § 368(a) (1) (A). Tax considerations applicable to each of the three methods of acquisitions are discussed in Darrell,
The Use of Reorganization Techniques in Corporate Acquisitions, 70 HARv. L. REv.
1183.(1957).
16. For an excellent in-depth discussion of the purposes and effects of the new California General Corporation Law as it relates to corporate combinations, see Barton,
Business Combinations and the New General Corporation Law, 9 Loy. L.A.L. REV.
738 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Barton]. See also Small, Corporate Combinations Under the New California General Corporation Law, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1190 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Small].
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tion. 1 7 If the requisite number of shareholders of each corporation
approve the plan, dissenting shareholders are provided appraisal rights
as a matter of law, requiring the respective corporations to purchase
back the dissenting shares, in cash, at their fair market value.18
Whenever the management of a prospective surviving or constituent
corporation' 9 contemplates pursuing a statutory merger or consolidation, one of its foremost considerations is the liability which attaches
to the transaction as a matter of law. By statute, the corporation
formed by a merger or consolidation is answerable for all of the acquired
or constituent corporation's liabilities, whether or not they are specifically assumed. 20 In addition, this assumption of liabilities applies regardless of whether the liabilities are known or contingent, 2 or arise
in contract or tort.22 Thus, a corporation which acquires the ownership,
operations, and property of another through statutory merger or consoliliabildation would-as a matter of law-inherit any potential products
23
ity and creditor claims existing against the acquired corporation.
17. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. §§ 152, 1201(a) (West 1977). Section 152 further
provides that the articles of incorporation may require the vote of a greater proportion
of the outstanding shares so entitled to vote to approve a plan for reorganization.
18. Id. § 1300(a). For a discussion of the development of the corporate power to
merge or consolidate with less than unanimous shareholder approval, see Levy, Rights
of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 420-21 (1930).
19. A "surviving corporation" is the corporation into which one or more other corporations are merged, whereas "constituent corporation" refers to the corporation which
is merged or consolidated with one or more others. Treadaway v. Camellia Convalescent Hosps., Inc., 43 Cal. App. 3d 189, 194 n.2, 118 Cal. Rptr. 341, 344 n.2 (1974).
20. The new General Corporation Law provides in pertinent part that upon merger
(or, in substance, consolidation) the surviving corporation shall be subject to all the
debts and liabilities of the constituent corporations "in the same manner as if the surviving corporation had itself incurred them." CAL. CoRp. CoDE ANN. § 1107 (West
1977).
21. Treadaway v. Camellia Convalescent Hosps., Inc., 43 Cal. App. 3d 189, 198,
118 Cal. Rptr. 341, 346 (1974). For a discussion of contingent liabilities with an
emphasis on the problem of unknown tax deficiencies, see Freling, Tax Consequences
of Nontax Motivated Aspects and Factors in the Sale of a Corporate Business, N.Y.U.
21st Inst. on Fed. Tax. 1107, 1130-31 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Freling]; Comment,
Transferee Liability and the C Reorganization, 40 U. CoLo. L. REv. 380, 385-86 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Transferee Liability].
22. It has been stated that the corporation ultimately formed assumes the debts and
liabilities of the constituent corporations, "whether they arise ex contractu or ex delicto."
Moe v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 289, 304, 98 Cal. Rptr. 547,
556-57 (1971) (surviving corporation liable in punitive damages for tort of extinct corporation).
23. Of course, this logic does not necessarily apply where the corporations fail to
comply with the statutory provisions governing merger and consolidation. In such a
situation, the courts would scrutinize the transaction within the context of the de facto
merger doctrine, discussed at notes 75-81 infra and accompanying text.
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Sale of Stock

The second method by which a corporation can acquire the ownership or business of another is through the purchase of the acquired corporation's stock. This transaction is less complex than a merger or
consolidation, as there are no statutory formalities with which the parties must comply.2" While the management of the acquiring corporation must authorize the transaction, there is no formal necessity for
shareholder approval rights,25 as the transfer is consummated directly
between the acquiring corporation and the shareholders of the transferor corporation. Likewise, there 2are
no formal appraisal rights for
6
the shareholders of either corpoation.
The transferee corporation in a purchase of stock transaction does
not directly assume all of the transferor's liabilities as a matter of law. 27
Rather, the transferee becomes indirectly liable for the transferor's
debts and obligations, from an economic standpoint, by virtue of the
fact that it is actually a shareholder in the transferor corporation. 8
Consequently, the transferee is insulated to some degree from any
catastrophic judgment since only its investment in the stock of the transferor is vulnerable to claims against the latter.29
24. If the shareholders of the acquired or transferor corporation receive only voting
stock of the acquiring or transferee corporation as consideration, and the transferee
gains "control" of the transferor corporation, the transaction will qualify as a Type
"B" reorganization and the selling shareholders will not be taxed at the time of acquisition. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B). Orlanski, supra note 9, at 362 n.2.
25. See generally C. SCHARF, ACQUISITIONS, MERGERS, SALES AND TAKEOVERS 25152 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Scharf]; INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION,
CREATIVE ACQUISITION TECHNIQUES 61-62 (1968).
26. See Freling, supra note 21, at 1108-09.
27. See note 20 supra.
28. This limited assumption of the transferor's liabilities by the corporation buying
its stock is sensible because subsequent to such a sale the selling corporation normally
continues its business and maintains its corporate existence. The buyer merely becomes
a shareholder of the seller, and like any other shareholder, exposes its assets to the
claims of the seller's creditors only to the extent of its investment therein. See INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, CREATIVE ACQUISITION TECHNIQUES 61-64
(1969); SCHARF, supra note 25, at 251-52.
Another potential advantage to this method of acquiring a seller's business is the
fact that the buyer may attempt to complete the transaction through a tender offer,
thereby avoiding the need for formal approval of the seller's shareholders or the cooperation of its management. Id.
Despite these advantages, the transferee must be conscious of the fact that a large
judgment against the transferor could significantly decrease the value of its purchased
stock. Additionally, if the transferor corporation dissolves subsequent to the transfer,
and all of its assets are distributed to the transferee, the transferee may still incur liability for the former's debts as a former stockholder. See Darrell, supra note 15, at 1202.
29. See Freling, supra note 21, at 1131.
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3.

Sale of Assets

The third method by which corporate interests may be transferred is

through the sale of corporate assets. This method is the most complex
insofar as assessing liabilities is concerned. Most sale of assets transactions of any consequence are subject to statutorily imposed formalities

which, although potentially less demanding than those imposed upon
merger or consolidation transactions, are similar insofar as they were
enacted primarily for the protection of shareholders and creditors.3
As in a merger, under California law3 ' a corporation may sell all or
substantially all 32 of its assets to another corporation upon the approval
of a majority of its outstanding shares. 3 However, unlike in a merger
reorganization, if its assets are exchanged solely for cash or its

equivalent neither a class vote nor the approval of the transferee's
stockholders is required. 34 To further relieve the parties in a sale of
30. See Brickston v. Federal Firearms Corp., 227 Cal. App. 2d 574, 579-80, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 793, 796 (1964) (stating that CAL. CORP. CODE § 3901 (West 1947) was enacted
solely for the protection of shareholders and creditors).
31. CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. § 1001(a) (West 1977). Insofar as shareholders'
voting and appraisal rights are concerned, the new California General Corporation Law
distinguishes between a sale-of-assets "reorganization" and other sale-of-assets transactions wherein assets are exchanged for cash or an equivalent. Under CAL. CORP. CODE
ANN. § 181(c) (West 1977), a "reorganization" occurs when the transferor corporation sells substantially all of its assets in exchange for the acquiring corporation's
equity securities or "debt securities which are not adequately secured and which have
a maturity date in excess of five years after the consummation of the reorganization
...
" Id. Just as in a merger, both corporate partners to such a reorganization must
comply with sections 1201(a) and 1300(a) by securing majority shareholder approval
of the "principal terms" of the reorganization, and affording appraisal rights to dissenting shareholders.
32. No particular percentage is controlling in the determination of what constitutes
"substantially all" of a transferor's assets. REv. RUL. 57-518, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 253
considers this a question of fact involving "the nature of the properties retained by
the transferor, the purpose of retention, and the amount thereof." BirrKER & EUsnCE,
supra note 11, at 41-42; Comment, Transferee Liability, supra note 21, at 382-84. In
effect, to constitute a sale of "substantially all" assets, the transaction must result in
the transfer of the transferor's business operations to the transferee.
33. If the transferor corporation transfers substantially all of its assets solely in exchange for voting stock in the transferee corporation, the transaction will qualify as
a Type "C" reorganization, rendering it a tax-free transaction. I.R.C. § 368(a) (1) (C).
See Orlanski, supra note 9, at 361 n.1.
In structuring a sale of assets as a Type "C" reorganization, a transferee should be
aware of the tendency of such transaction to fall within the purview of the de facto
merger doctrine. See note 80 infra.
34. Such a transaction is not a reorganization within the terms of CAL. CoRP. CODE
ANN. § 181(c) (West 1977). It therefore falls within the purview of section 1001(a),
requiring approval only of the shareholders of the assets transferor. Furthermore,
in contrast to section 1201(a), applying to reorganizations, holders of non-voting
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assets of the burdens imposed upon merger or reorganization participants, California has not enacted an appraisal statute for the benefit
of stockholders dissenting to such a sale.3 5
As compared to a merger or consolidation, a sale of substantially all
assets as a means of transfering a business operation is attractive for
several reasons. First, the transferee corporation can avoid the nondeductible expense and the problems inherent in holding a shareholder's meeting to approve the transaction. Second, the transaction
can be effectuated without either corporation suffering the economic
burden of paying off dissenting shareholders. 30
While a transaction structured as a sale of substantially all assets may
be attractive for the above reasons, its greatest advantage over a merger,
consolidation or a sale of stock is the freedom from unassumed liabilities
it affords the transferee. The "general rule" has been accepted in most
American jurisdictions addressing the issue. 7 It provides that a transferee corporation which purchases all3 the assets of another corporation
stock are not entitled to participate in approving an assets-for-cash transaction. Id.
§ 1001(a). See Small, supra note 16, at 1209-14.
35. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 1300(a) (West 1977) provides dissenters? rights
only in reorganizations under sections 1201(a), (b), (e), and in short-form mergers.
See Barton, supra note 16, at 784-87. See generally Small, supra note 16 (expressing
dissatisfaction with the statutory treatment of sale-of-assets transactions under the
new California General Corporation Law); Note, Corporations: Sale of Assets: Dissenting Shareholders' Appraisal Right in Absence of Appraisal Statute 46 CALIF. L. REV.
283 (1958) (expressing the view that the absence of an appraisal statute under the "old
law" was illogical and inequitable to dissenting shareholders).
36. See generally Freling, supra note 21, at 1107-09. The relative advantages of a
sale of assets over a merger with respect to taxes and avoidance of shareholders rights
of dissent and appraisal are implied by the discussion in Farris v. Glen Alden Corp.,
143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958).
37. See, e.g., Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 625 (7th Cir.
1971); West Tex. Ref. & Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 68 F.2d 77, 81 (10th Cir. 1933);
Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250, 1251 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Kloberdanz v.
Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 820 (D. Colo. 1968) (applying California law); Ortiz
v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 846, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556, 558 (1975);
FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 7122 at 188.
38. There has been some inconsistency with the inclusion of the word all in reference
to the quantity of assets transferred when reciting the "general rule." Compare, e.g.,
Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 364 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 965 (1975); Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 625
(7th Cir. 1971) which exclude the term all, with, e.g., Lopata v. Bemis Co., Inc., 406
F. Supp. 521, 525 (E.D. Pa. 1975) and Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp.
817, 820 (D. Colo. 1968) which include the term all. The Kloberdanz court, applying
California law, discounted the apparent inconsistency by stating that as far as the application of the "general rule" was concerned, the emphasis should be on whether the sale
was a bona fide one involving the payment of money or property sufficient for the
transferor to respond to liability claims against it. Id, at 820-21. It appears, then,,
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for adequate consideration, does not, by reason of the transfer, assume

any of the transferor's debts or liabilities.

9

This freedom from any

liability not specifically assumed is functional when examined in the

context of creditor protection and the traditional rights of bona fide
purchasers.4 0

A sale of assets, unlike a merger or consolidation, leaves the
corporate structure of the transferor virtually intact. If the assets are
purchased for adequate consideration 4 ' by a transferee who has no

notice of any prior claims against them,4" the transferor's creditors are
that the "general rule" would be applicable to a transfer of any amount of assets as
long as it was accomplished by means of a bona fide purchase.
39. While the "general rule" protects the transferee corporation from assuming any
of the transferor's liabilities by reason of the sale, many times the transferor will wield
enough bargaining power to make the purchaser contractually assume some of them,
resulting in reduction in the price of the assets transferred. The specific liabilities assumed by the purchaser are normally enumerated in a schedule accompanying the contract of sale. See, e.g., Adams v. General Dynamics Corp., 405 F. Supp. 1020, 1022
(N.D. Cal. 1975) (contract containing a disclaimer of assumption of any nondisclosed
liabilities); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 819 (D. Colo. 1968).
40. See Note, Assumption of Products Liability in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L.
REv. 86, 91-95 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Assumption of Products Liability] for
an excellent analysis of the development of the "general rule" within the context of
creditor protection.
41. It was explained in Pierre v. Riverside Mortgage See. Co., 25 Cal. App. 2d 248,
257, 77 P.2d 226, 230-31 (1938), that "sufficient consideration" consists of money or
property equal to the fair market value of the assets conveyed which the transferor
can then apply to the payment of its debts and liabilities. As the following language
indicates, failure to tender sufficient consideration may have grievous results for the
purchaser:
It would be manifestly unfair, unjust, and contrary to equity that it [the transferee] should thus acquire all the assets of the other corporation . .. leaving no
one to be sued by its creditors and no property to satisfy its debts and other liabilities, and not itself become responsible for such debts and other liabilities. If it
takes the benefit, it must as has so often been said, take the burden, which equitably
attaches with it.
Malone v. Red Top Cab Co., 16 Cal. App. 2d 268, 273, 60 P.2d 543, 545-46 (1936)
(quoting McAlister v. American Ry. Express Co., 103 S.E. 129, 130 (N.C. 1920)). The
California courts, when dealing with situations in which the transferor and the transferee
have substantially the same ownership, have consistently held that the lack of adequate
consideration constitutes a fraud on the former's creditors. See, e.g., Atkinson v.
Western Day. Syndicate, 170 Cal. 503, 510, 150 P. 360, 363 (1915); Economy Ref.
& Serv. Co. v. Royal Nat'l Bank, 20 Cal. App. 3d 434, 439, 97 Cal. Rptr. 706, 710
(1971); notes 56 & 69 and text accompanying notes 67-69 infra.
42. It is a well settled common-law rule that as between a creditor and a bona fide
purchaser, the latter will prevail. A transferee who has purchased in good faith, for
valuable consideration, and with no notice of prior claims to the property in question,
is a "bona fide purchaser." Frankish v. Federal Mortgage Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d 700,
716, 87 P.2d 90, 97 (1939). It follows that a corporation which purchases the assets
of another in good faith, for valuable consideration, and with no notice of creditors'
claims to the assets, will prevail over the creditors. See Pringle v. Hunsicker, 154

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10

left with an entity capable of satisfying their claims and should be logically precluded from pursuing the innocent transferee. It is the value
of the transferor's assets, not the assets themselves, which represent the
43
creditors' security.

The array of potential liabilities from which the "general rule"
shields bona fide purchasers of corporate assets consists not only of
creditors' claims against the transferor, but also of claims founded in

tort." At first glance, it would seem that the reasoning underlying the
"general rule" would be equally applicable to tort victims as it is to
creditors.

The valuable consideration tendered to the transferor could

be utilized equally for the satisfaction of judgments based in tort and
those based on the demands of creditors. This reasoning breaks down,
however, in those situations increasingly encountered in the area of
products liability, where the transferor corporation has liquidated, dissolved or otherwise become insolvent 45 before the tort claimant's cause
Cal. App. 2d 789, 795, 316 P.2d 742, 746 (1957).
It is interesting to note that the surviving corporation in a merger or consolidation
is deemed to have constructive notice of the claims of creditors of the acquired corporation, thereby making it impossible to take it in "good faith." One court claimed that
a contrary rule would work a "constructive fraud" upon the creditors of the acquired
corporation. Treadaway v. Camellia Convalescent Hosps., Inc., 43 Cal. App. 3d 189,
199, 118 Cal. Rptr. 341, 348 (1974).
43. The rights of creditors are further provided for by statute in the form of the
Bulk Sales Transfer Act, CAL. COM. CODE ANN. §§ 6101-6111 (West Supp. 1977).
This Act essentially requires a transferee of assets to provide notice of a transfer in
bulk to all of the transferor's creditors prior to the transaction. Failure to comply
with this procedure will result in the transfer being deemed fraudulent and will subject
the acquired assets to liability. One consolation to prospective transferees, however,
is the relatively narrow scope of the Act. Neither manufacturers nor service enterprises
not specifically listed in the Act are subject to its application. CAL. COM. CODE ANN.
§ 6102, comment 9 (West 1964). See generally Orlauski, supra note 9, at 388-91.
Because it is not applicable to manufacturers, it is questionable whether the Bulk Transfer Act would be of much assistance to products liability claimants.
44. See, e.g., Forest Laboratories Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971);
Adams v. General Dynamics Corp., 405 F. Supp. 1020 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Ortiz v. South
Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1975).
45. Dissolution and liquidation are defined and distinguished in N. LATn'N, LArrIN
ON CORPORAMONS § 175 (2d ed. 1971), quoted in Juenger & Schulman, Assets Sales
and Products Liability, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 39, 40-41 n.6 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Juenger & Schulman] as follows:
"Dissolution," as in partnership law, means the termination of the legal existence
of the corporation so that the unit may no longer carry on under its former franchises, for it has none with which to function. Liquidation or winding up involves
the process of liquidating the assets, paying the creditors, and distributing whatever
is left, after liquidation expenses, to the shareholders in accordance with their contracts and, if there are no special contracts, then pro rata according to their shareholding interest.
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of action has even accrued.4 6

While the "general rule" may protect

creditors and facilitate corporate business acquisitions by eliminating
the transferee's need to provide for contingent liabilities, it may, at the

same time, seriously prejudice a products liability claimant in his search
for a viable defendant.
B.

The Plaintiff's Dilemma in a Post-Dissolution
ProductsLiability Action

When a products liability victim is injured by a defective product

subsequent to the manufacturer's sale of all its assets, he is left with
two options in his search for redress.

The first would be to sue the

manufacturer of the product hoping that the consideration it receives
in exchange for its assets will be sufficient to satisfy his claim. A
second option would be to assert a theory other than that of the "general
rule," so as to enable him to sue the present owner of the assets.
The first of these two options is of dubious practical value in the
event that the manufacturer who produced the defective item, and later
sold its assets, has liquidated and dissolved prior to the claimant's in-

jury.4 7 As provided by law, a corporation in the process of dissolution
or winding up must adequately provide for the satisfaction of its "known
debts and liabilities" before it can distribute its assets among its share-

holders (or the consideration received from the sale of those assets). 48
While this section provides an adequate remedy to "known" or ascer-

tainable creditors at the time of corporate dissolution, it provides no
46. In California, a cause of action for personal injury resulting from a defective
product or defective condition created by a defendant does not accrue until the date
of the injury. Howe v. Pioneer Mfg. Co., 262 Cal. App. 2d 330, 340, 68 Cal. Rptr.
617, 623 (1968). In the event that a victim is "blamelessly ignorant" of the cause
of his injury, and can later prove so, the statute of limitations has been deemed not
to begin to run "until the person knows or, by the exercise of reasonable diligence,
should have discovered the cause of injury." G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court,
49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 25, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 220 (1975). Likewise, a cause of action
for damage to property under a theory of products liability is deemed not to accrue
until the date of the damage. Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 617,
77 Cal. Rptr. 633, 640 (1969). The same applies to a cause of action based upon
a theory of breach of express or implied warranty. Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing
Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 584, 360 P.2d 897, 903, 12 Cal. Rptr. 257, 263 (1961).
47. For an exhaustive study of corporate liability for "post-dissolution claims" see
Henn & Alexander, Effect of Corporate Dissolution on Products Liability Claims, 56
CORNELL L. REV. 865, 896-915 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Henn & Alexander]. For
a more brief but nevertheless valuable discussion of the potential remedies available
to post-dissolution products liability claimants, see Juenger & Schulman, supra note
45, at 40-44.
48. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 2004 (West 1977).
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such security to 4a "contingent" products liability claim which arises after
the distribution. 9
California also provides by statute that a dissolved corporation continues to exist for the purpose of defending lawsuits and discharging
its obligations."0 Under this statute, post-dissolution products liability
claimants could conceivably attempt to satisfy their claims by proceeding against the directors of the dissolved transferor under the theory
that they were responsible for making adequate provisions for the
satisfaction of corporate liabilities before distribution."' However, this
approach may be of limited value since it has never been effectively
utilized to satisfy post-dissolution claims. 52 Even if the products liability claimant was successful in bringing such an action, it would be questionable whether the directors involved could financially satisfy a
judgment.
The final means by which a post-dissolution claimant might reach the
transferor is through a "creditor's bill in equity."" This remedy is
based on the common law doctrine that the consideration received by
the transferor for its assets is to be treated as a trust fund subject to
an equitable charge for all debts owed by the dissolved corporation. "
After the transferor has liquidated and dissolved however, a judgment
cannot be recovered without tracing the dispersed trust fund into the
hands of the shareholders. In the case of a claimant whose cause of
action may not arise for several years after this distribution, the probability of collecting a satisfactory judgment, or of even locating the
numerous co-defendants, would be slight. Faced with these practical
difficulties and the meager chances of successful recovery against a
transferor corporation which has dissolved prior to his injury, a products
49. Two approaches to the problem by means of indemnity and escrow agreements
are suggested in Barton, supra note 16, at 807 n.262.
50. CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. § 2010 (West 1977).
51. Id.§§ 316(a) (2), 2009.
52. Zinn v. Bright, 9 Cal. App. 3d 188, 87 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1970). See Henn &
Alexander, supra note 47, at 908 & n.220.
53. Zinn v. Bright, 9 Cal. App. 3d 188, 192-93, 87 Cal. Rptr. 736, 739-40 (1970).
54. Id. at 192-93, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 739. See also Updike v. United States, 8 F.2d
913, 917 (8th Cir. 1925). While this theory was developed to satisfy pre-dissolution
claims, one authority suggests that there is no reason why it should not be applied to
post-dissolution products liability claims, absent legislation to the contrary. Henn &
Alexander, supra note 47, at 909 & n.222. See Wallach, Products Liability: A Remedy
in Search of a Defendant-The Effect of a Sale of Assets and Subsequent Dissolution
on Product DissatisfactionClaims, 41 Mo. L. REv. 321, 327-35 (1976), for an argument
in support of the "trust fund" theory as a viable means of recovering post-dissolution
product liability claims.
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liability claimant may alternatively pursue the transferee corporation in
his search for relief.
1. Exceptions to the "General Rule"
Just as the courts have traditionally recognized the general rule that

a transferee corporation does not, by reason of its purchase of another's
assets assume the transferor's liabilities, so they have recognized four

exceptions to that rule. Liability incurred by the seller-transferor,
whether it be liability to creditors or to tort victims,55 may be imposed
on the purchaser-transferee where: (1) the purchaser expressly or im-

pliedly agrees to assume such liability; (2) the transaction is entered
into fraudulently to escape such liability; (3) the transaction amounts
to a consolidation or merger of the seller and purchaser; or (4) the
purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling corporation.5 6
Four 'California cases have utilized the exceptions to the "general rule"
in determining the liability of a transferee of assets for products liability
claims resulting from the transferor's defective products and have
denied recovery to the plaintiff.5 7 A detailed examination of each ex-

ception may assist in determining its appropriate use in products
liability suits.
C.

TraditionalTests for the Imposition of Liability
on Business Assets Transferees-Exceptions
to the "GeneralRule"

An examination of the four exceptions leads to the conclusion that
inadequate consideration and the extinction of the transferor as a corpo55. See note 44 supra.
56. Some courts have recognized the absence of adequate consideration for the sale
or transfer of assets as being a fifth exception to the "general rule." See, e.g., McKee
v. Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98, 102 (N.J. L. Div. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 288
A.2d 585 (N.J. App. Div. 1972). The reason for imposition of liability on the transferee in such cases "is that the seller will be thereby rendered insolvent and unable to
pay its debts." Id. at 107. California has not recognized lack of consideration as being
a separate exception, but rather treats it as an element of each of the other exceptions,
most notably that of fraud. See, e.g., Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d
842, 847, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556, 558 (1975); Economy Ref. & Serv. Co. v. Royal Nat1
Bank, 20 Cal. App. 3d 434, 439, 97 Cal. Rptr. 706, 710 (1971).
57. Adams v. General Dynamics Corp., 405 F. Supp. 1020 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968) (diversity case applying California law); Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556
(1975); Schwartz v. McGraw-Edison Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 767, 92 Cal. Rptr. 776
(1971). Schwartz was the only case which failed to specifically mention that the transferor dissolved before the injury in question occurred.
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rate entity as a consequence of the sale are the common denominators
of transferee liability.58 This suggests that the exceptions, like the rule
itself, were developed primarily for the protection of known creditors
and the facilitation of corporate transactions.
Freedom to contract for the assumption or non-assumption of specific
liabilities is basic to a transferee's ability to calculate the precise
economic consequences of a particular transaction. The "general rule,"
as it has been applied to transferees of corporate assets for adequate
consideration, apparently protects this freedom.59 The specific liabilities assumed by the transferee of assets are usually enumerated in the
contract for sale. 60 Where the interpretation of the contract does not
rest on the credibility of extrinsic evidence, the court has been forced
to decide which of the transferor's liabilities 'the transferee may have
specifically or impliedly assumed.01
It has been the practice in California for the courts to narrowly
construe any specific contractual assumption by the transferee of the
transferor's liabilities. For example, where a contract for sale of assets
did not specifically enumerate the transferee's assumption of the transferor's tort liability, the court found an intent on the part of the parties
that the transferor retain that liability. 62 This standard of interpretation
ultimately shielded the transferee from a products liability claim which
arose after the transfer and after the transferor had dissolved.03 The
claimant was left without a remedy. In addition, the purchasers of corporate assets have been permitted to specifically exclude or disclaim
the assumption of any non-disclosed or contingent liabilities which may
04
arise from the transferor's former activities.
Courts have sometimes found an implied assumption of liability on
behalf of the transferee, depending upon the circumstances of the
58. See Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 366 & n.16 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 7122 (footnotes
omitted).
59. See note 39 supra.
60. Id.; FLETCHER, supra note 5, §§ 7114-7115 (footnotes omitted).
61. Schwartz v. McGraw-Edison Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 767, 778-79, 92 Cal. Rptr.
776, 782 (1971).
62. Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821 (D. Colo. 1968) (applying
California law).
63. Id. at 817.
64. Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 846, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556, 558
(1975); Adams v. General Dynamics Corp., 405 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
Other jurisdictions have construed similar contractual terms more stringently. See,
e.g., Husak v. Berkel, Inc., 341 A.2d 174, 178 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) (finding that
a disclaimer of liability for strict liability claims lacked sufficient precision to relieve
the transferor from assuming liability).

1977]

LIABILITY OF CORPORATE TRANSFEREES

case. 65 This most frequently occurs when the transferee receives all
of the transferor's assets in exchange for inadequate consideration, the
transferee having reason to know that the selling company would be

unable to meet its obligations.66
The essence of the fraudulent transfer exception is the sale of corporate assets for insufficient consideration. This leaves little money for
the satisfaction of the selling corporation's debts.6 7 As explained by

one California court:
Transfers of all of the assets of a person or corporation in straitened
circumstances, without fair consideration, to a corporation having substantially the same ownership, by which the just claims of creditors
are defeated, are of such fraudulent nature that the new corporation
may be held to the debt of the old. 68

Generally, a sale of total assets will not be deemed a fraudulent transaction imposing liability on the transferee if the purchase is made in
good faith, for fair consideration, and without notice of prior claims to
the property in question. 9
While the corporate rule discouraging fraudulent conveyances serves
to protect the rights of creditors as well as those of the bona fide pur65. See Hoche Prods., S.A. v. Jayark Films Corp., 256 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), cited in FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 7124 n.3. Apparently, courts infrequently
utilize this form of an exception to the "general rule," preferring one of the established
exceptions.
66. FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 7126.
67. See note 56 supra.
68. Economy Ref. & Serv. Co. v. Royal Nat'l Bank, 20 Cal. App. 3d 434, 439, 97
Cal. Rptr. 706, 710 (1971). Accord, Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d
842, 849, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556, 560 (1975); Malone v. Red Top Cab Co., 16 Cal. App.
2d 268, 273, 60 P.2d 543, 545-46 (1936).
69. See note 41 supra. California treats stock in the purchasing corporation as sufficient consideration in a sale of assets if that stock is marketable and can be applied
to the satisfaction of the transferor's debts. In one California case, the court indicated
that "the emphasis should be on whether the sale was a bona fide one involving the
payment of money or property to the selling corporation . . . ." Kloberdanz v. Joy
Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 820-21 (D. Colo. 1968) (emphasis added). Accord, Pierce
v. Riverside Mortgage See. Co., 25 Cal. App. 2d 248, 257, 77 P.2d 226, 231 (1938).
On the other hand, stock delivered directly to the shareholders of the selling corporation in return for all of its assets, instead of to the corporation itself, has been deemed
a fraudulent conveyance since it leaves the transferor insolvent and incapable of satisfying its creditors. Upon such a delivery, the purchaser will be a "party to a diversion
of the trust fund" to the exclusion of the transferor's creditors and will incur the liabilities of the latter. Lamb v. Leroy Corp., 454 P.2d 24, 27 (Nev. 1969). The rule is
supported by the theory that the purchaser has constructive knowledge that the rights
of creditors will be impaired by his action. See Comment, Transferee Liability, supra
note 21, at 397. For an explanation of "trust fund" see text accompanying note 54
supra.
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chaser of assets, it is of virtually no significance to a products liability
claimant whose cause of action may not arise until after the "trust fund"
has been dispersed.
A corporation selling its assets to another corporation will typically
include both intangible and tangible property. 70 As previously discussed,71 the transferee can avoid satisfying dissenters' appraisal rights
if it pays cash consideration. It may enjoy the benefits of the transferor's business operations, without incurring its liabilities, even if it pays
with marketable securities, by structuring what is in effect a total transfer of the seller's business as a sale of assets, rather than a merger or
consolidation. It was in order to scrutinize these types of transactions
for possible prejudice to creditors and dissenting shareholders that the
courts developed the third7 2 and fourth 73 exceptions to the "general
74

rule."
The courts have implemented the third exception to the "general rule"
by what has come to be known as the de facto merger doctrine. This
consists of an examination by the court of the contract for sale of assets
together with the consequences of the transaction to determine whether

or not it has the "indicia" or consequences of a merger.71 In the event
that it does, the purchaser will be required to comply with the provisions controlling a statutory merger, i.e., grant dissenters' appraisal
rights76 and assume all of the acquired corporation's liabilities.
70. These include not only the transferor's machinery, equipment, and inventory, but
many times the use of the seller's name, the trade names of its products, its customer
lists, licenses, patents, trademarks, and business good will. See, e.g., Ortiz v. South
Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 847, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556, 559 (1975); Schwartz v.
McGraw-Edison Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 767, 779, 92 Cal. Rptr. 776, 782 (1971). The
intangible assets are equally as valuable as the tangible property insofar as the transferee's
ability to continue the transferor's business operations is concerned. Their acquisition
will be reflected in the purchase price.
71. See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
72. The purchasing corporation will incur the seller's liabilities if the transaction
amounts to a merger or consolidation.
73. The purchasing corporation will incur the seller's liabilities if it is merely a continuation of the selling corporation.
74. See generally Note, 6 SETON HALL L. R-v.477, 482-86 (1975).
75. See Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250, 1251 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Farris
v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25, 28 (Pa. 1958). See also Note, 6 SETON HALL
L. REV. 477, 482 (1975), which enumerates some of the factors which have beert con.
sidered by courts in finding de facto mergers.
76. The de facto merger doctrine has traditionally been used for the purpose of ascertaining dissenting shareholders' appraisal rights. See, e.g., Applestein v. United Bd,
& Carton Corp., 159 A.2d 146 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), aftd per curiam, 161 A.2d
474 (1960); Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 161 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958). The Applestein
court concluded that: "lit is proper to disregard the form of a sale or purchase of
assets transaction, when its characteristics are virtually identical to those of a statutory
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The only definitive use of the de facto merger doctrine as it has been
applied in products liability suits against transferee corporations under
California law may be found in Kloberdanz v. Joy Manufacturing Co.7
The facts in Kloberdanz are typical of those involving a determination
of a transferee's liability for the products liability of its transferor. In
1960, the defendant Joy purchased the bulk of the assets, including the
name and trademark of a manufacturer of oil drilling machinery for
cash consideration. By the terms of the sale, the manufacturer would
retain some real and personal property and Joy would not assume any
liabilities arising from the transferor's torts.71 The manufacturer-seller
continued as a corporate entity, leasing its property and investing the
consideration received until its dissolution ten months after the sale. The
plaintiff was injured three years after the manufacturer-seller's dissolution. He then brought suit against Joy contending that the sale of
assets in effect constituted a merger, thereby imputing liability to the
purchaser for the seller's torts. 9
The court rejected plaintiff's contention by not finding a de facto
merger. In so doing, it described two primary characteristics indicative of a merger. First, there was no evidence of there being any
continuity of management or stockholder interest from the transferor
to the transferee, as "both companies were strangers and dealt at arms
length before and after the sale."80 Second, the transferor continued
merger . . . for the purpose of insuring dissenting stockholders their appraisal rights."
159 A.2d at 156 (emphasis in original).
77. 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968) (applying California law); accord, Ortiz v.
South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1975). The Kloberdanz
criteria for determining a de facto merger (or consolidation) has also been cited as
authoritative in other jurisdictions. See Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250,
1252 (E.D. Wis. 1973); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98, 104 (N.J.L. Div.
1970), afj'd per curiam, 288 A.2d 585 (N.J. App. Div. 1972). While no California
court has actually imposed liability by means of the de facto merger doctrine, its use
in Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958) was cited with approval by
the California Supreme Court in Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 117,
460 P.2d 464, 477-78, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 605-06 (1969).
78. Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 818-20 (D. Colo. 1968).
79. Id. at 818, 820.
80. Id. at 821-22. Implicit in this statement is the determination by the court that
the consideration passing from the purchaser to the seller was "adequate." The fact
that the purchaser paid cash insured that there would be no mixture of stockholders
following the sale. Whereas stock in the purchasing company in exchange for assets
is not itself inadequate consideration, see note 69 supra, it can, under certain circumstances, indicate an absorption by the transferee of the transferor's stockholders. Such
a transaction highly suggests that it is a merger. See, e.g., Good v. Lackawanna
Leather Co., 233 A.2d 201, 208-09 (Super. Ct. Chi. Div. 1967). In any event, it would
dismiss the possibility of the companies being "strangers after the sale."
The danger that a stock-for-assets sale might fall within the purview of the de facto
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as a separate and distinct corporate entity, for however short a time,
after the transfer. 8 ' Basic to the court's determination that the transaction lacked the requisite elements of a merger was that the fact that by
the continued existence of the seller as a separate corporate entity after
the sale, its creditors would not be prejudiced. Therefore, it is clear that
a de facto merger will not be found if cash is paid in consideration for
a company's assets and the company exists as an entity after the sale,
capable of responding to its debts.
The fourth exception to the general rule applies when the transferee
is but a "mere continuation" of the transferor. This exception reflects
the preoccupation with the concepts of "separate entities" and "adequate consideration" similar to that of the de facto merger doctrine. As
most frequently interpreted, liability for the obligations of the transferor
will be imposed on the transferee when it is determined that the latter
is in effect a reincarnation of the former.8 2 Application of the exception requires that the relationship between the transacting companies be characterized by a continuity of management,"5 stockholder
interest, 4 and, most importantly, "insufficient consideration running
from the new company to the old."8 5 It is interesting to note, howmerger doctrine takes on added significance when it is the intention of the parties to
structure a transaction which will qualify as a "Type C" reorganization and thereby
be tax free. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C). See note 26 supra. One of the several requirements which must be met to qualify for tax free status is that only voting stock of
the purchasing corporation may be paid to the seller as consideration. Compliance
with this requirement has in turn been interpreted as importing "a continuity of interest
on the part of the transferor or its shareholders in the properties transferred." Cinnocca
v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 527, 531-32 (E.D. Okla. 1975). See Comment, Transferee Liability, supra note 21, at 382-84; Daugherty v. Ball, 43 F.R.D. 329,
334 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (holding that a "Type C" reorganization constituted a "practical
merger").
81. Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821 (D. Colo. 1968).
82. See Note, Assumption of ProductsLiability, supra note 40, at 100-01.
83. Pringle v. Hunsicker, 154 Cal. App. 2d 789, 793, 316 P.2d 742, 745 (1957) (finding continuity of management and absence of adequate consideration as being essential
elements of the continuation exception).
84. Stanford Hotel Co. v. M. Schwind Co., 180 Cal. 348, 354, 181 P. 780, 783 (1919)
(stating that the continuation exception contemplates the continued activity of "practically the same stockholders and directors"). The court further stated that "equity will
strip off the mask of a separate corporate identity, when it is but a mask . . . ." Id.
See Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821 (D.Colo. 1968) (no continuation when there was no common identity of stock, directors, officers, or stockholders).
85. Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 847, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556, 558
(1975). See Adams v. General Dynamics Corp., 405 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (N.D. Cal.
1975) (no continuation when, inter alia, the consideration was sufficient to pay all
the known debts of the transferor). The Ortiz court further indicated that any deliberate effort to effect a change in corporate ownership for the purpose of cutting off liabil-
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ever, that it is of no consequence that the purchaser continues the

business operations of the seller virtually intact, so long as the consideration tendered is adequate and the seller maintains its existence as an
entity capable of responding to its creditors.8 6 The business may be
continued without imposing the transferor's liabilities on the transferee
because, "the test is not the continuation of the business operation but

the continuation of the corporate entity.""7
The rationale developed for the "mere continuation" test,88 like the
other three corporate exceptions to the "general rule," was primarily for
the protection of creditors. Whereas the traditional rules governing
corporate acquisitions have served their purpose admirably, they have

failed to provide an adequate remedy to persons injured by defective
products subsequent to the manufacturer's sale of its business and its

dissolution. In effect, products liability claimants have been defeated
by corporate rules which are unrelated to the theory of strict liability
in California.
III.

FROM ENTITY LIABILITY TO ENTERPRISE LIABILITYTHE COURTS' RESPONSE

A.

The ConflictingPolicies Underlyingthe "General
Rule" and Strict Liability in Tort

Strict liability is but one of three causes of action which make up
the field of products liability, the other two being negligence and the
law of express or implied warranty. 9 The doctrine of strict liability
originated as a hybrid of the other two doctrines; 90 it relies on neither
ity would fall within the fraudulent transfer exception to the general rule. 46 Cal.
App. 3d 842, 849, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556, 560.
86. The court in McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98 (N.J.L. Div. 1970),
afr'd per curiam, 288 A.2d 585 (N.J. App. Div. 1972) explained:
When one company purchases all the assets of another, it is to be expected that
the purchasing corporation will continue the operations of the former, but this does
not by itself render the purchaser liable for the obligations of the former. For
liability to attach, the purchasing corporation must represent merely a "new hat"
for the seller.
Id. at 570, 264 A.2d at 106.
87. National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Borden Co., 363 F. Supp. 978, 980 (E.D. Wis.
1973).
88. For a disoussion of the "mere continuation" exception as it has been applied to
the issue of a corporation's duties under its transferor's collective bargaining agreements,
see Note, 27 MAINE L. Rav. 305, 313-15 (1975). For a recent case on point see Acheson v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 523 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1975). See also note 148 infra.
89. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF Tm LAw oF TORTS 641-82 (4th ed. 1971).
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment b (1965); Santor v.
A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 311 (N.J. 1965).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10

of the above causes of action for its effect 9 and has virtually superseded
the law of warranty as a basis of recovery for injury due to defective
2
products.
The history of products liability law has been characterized by the
steady abolition of various bars to recovery.

Among these were such

requirements as privity, disclaimer, and notice of breach, all elements
stemming from the law of warranty.03 The doctrine of strict liability was
adopted in California largely in response to the recognized inadequacy
of the law of warranty as a means of providing a remedy for products
related injuries."' The public policy underlying the doctrine was first espoused by Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 3 and
later became the analytical basis for the strict liability cause of action
adopted as the law of California in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc.9 6 As formulated in the Greenman opinion, "a manufacturer is
strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing
that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a
defect that causes injury to a human being." '

The rule was "to insure

that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne
by the manufacturers who put such products on the market rather than
by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves."95
91. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63-64, 377 P.2d 897,
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
92. Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 432, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369,
373 (1969).
It has been suggested by one authority that if the plaintiff can make
out a case in negligence or breach of warranty he will also most probably have a case
in strict liability. J. COTcHErr & R. CARTWRIGHT, CALIFORNIA PRODUCTS LAnILIY
AcTIONS § 2.0-[4] (Supp. 1975) [hereinafter cited as CoTcHETr & CARTWRIGHT].
93. See Presser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1127-34 (1960).
94. See Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HAS*INGS U. 9,
16-17 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Prosser].
95. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (concurring opinion).
Even if there is no negligence . . . public policy demands that responsibility
be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and healt
inherent in defective products ....
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss
of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and
a needless one for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business. It is to the public interest
to discourage the marketing of products having defects that are a menace to the
public ....
However intermittently such injuries may occur and however haphazardly they may strike, the risk of their occurrence is a constant risk and a
general one. Against such a risk there should be general and constant protection
and the manufacturer is best situated to afford such protection.
Id.
96. 59 Cal. 2d 57,62-64, 377 P.2d 897, 900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700-01 (1963).
97. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
98. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
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The intent that the manufacturer and not the consumer bear the risk
of injuries due to defective products was clearly expressed. 9
The strict liability cause of action as formulated in Greenman
eliminated the need for a claimant to prove either a breach of warranty
or a breach of duty by the manufacturer to recover for product-related
injuries. Justice Traynor made it vividly clear that the liability of a
manufacturer of a defective product was to be governed by the law of
strict liability in tort and not by the law of contract warranties. 100 Thus,
the contractual procedures inherent in the law of warranty which had
previously buffered manufacturers from liability no longer served as a
bar to recovery. 10 1 They simply were not consistent with the court's
intention that the costs of product-related injuries be shifted to those
better able to absorb and distribute them. "Accordingly, rules defining
and governing warranties that were developed to meet the needs of
commercial transactions cannot properly be invoked to govern the
manufacturer's liability to those injured by their defective products unless those rules serve the purposes for which such liability is
imposed.'1

02

It is not necessary to go to extremes to recognize an analogy between
the corporate "general rule" which shields a purchaser of assets from
any liabilities that it does not contractually assume, and the law of
warranty which once allowed a manufacturer to limit the scope of
its liability to consumers. The "general rule," like the rules of warranty,
functions well in a commercial setting. However, under certain cir99. California has been more progressive in its adherence to this policy than the
majority of other jurisdictions which follow the Restatement approach to strict liability.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965) provides in part:

One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the user or consumer, or to his property ...
(Emphasis added). While the necessity of proving a defective product "unreasonably
dangerous" is an element of the strict liability cause of action under the Restatement,
California has rejected this requirement with the rationale that it is inconsistent with
the Greenman formulation (see text accompanying note 97 supra), that it increases
the plaintiff's burden, and that it "represents a step backward in the area pioneered
by this court." Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153,
1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972).

100. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).

101. These bars included the statutory provisions of
and the UCC which provided such defenses to breach of
notice of injury to the seller and disclaimers of liability
Prosser, supra note 94, at 20, 46-48.
102. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).

the UNIFORM SALES ACT
warranty actions as lack of
by the manufacturer. S'ee
57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901,
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cumstances, like the rules of warranty, it can "frustrate rational compensation for physical injury."'10 3 For example, the transaction which
frequently occurs10 4 is where a corporate purchaser of assets acquires
the business of another company, knowing that the seller will subsequently dissolve, but contractually disclaims any assumption of contingent liabilities. Insofar as any future products liability claim is concerned, 10 the claimant's chances of recovery are frustrated by the "general rule" just as much as if by the rules of warranty. By means of
a contract for the sale of assets, two corporations have effectively
bartered away the rights of any future products liability claimants. This
is difficult to reconcile with the California public policy governing
actions in strict liability. "The remedies of injured consumers ought
106
not to be made to depend upon the intricacies of the law of sales."'
The "general rule" and its exceptions were applied to assets sales
primarily to preserve the property rights of bona fide corporate purchasers." 7 The fact that the rule in effect only shielded from the unassumed liabilities of their vendors "good faith" purchasers who paid
adequate consideration suggests that the application of the rule rests
on an absence of fault on the part of the purchaser. This reliance on
the idea of fault reinforces the inapplicability of the "general rule" to

claims based on strict liability. Fault is a negligence concept and has
no place in a strict liability action. It is a well settled rule that a seller
is strictly liable in tort for injury caused by his defective product "al103. Seeley v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 16, 403 P.2d 145, 150, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17, 22 (1965) (discussing how warranty theory is not suited to the field of liability
for personal injuries).
104. See notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text.
105. Recall that a cause of action in strict liability does not accrue until the date
of the injury. See note 46 supra. While this may result in hardship to persons
injured by defective products after the dissolution of the manufacturer, it is certainly
more consistent with the public policy supporting strict liability than the statute which
governed breach of warranty actions. CAL. COM. CODE ANN. § 2725 (West Supp. 1977)
provides in part that a cause of action for breach of any contract for sale accrues when
the breach occurs, and an action for breach of warranty occurs on tender of delivery.
Utilization of this rule in products liability cases would provide manufacturers with a
means of assessing the extent of their contingent liabilities, as they would cease upon
delivery of the product and the running of the statute of limitations. The courts' refusal
to use this statute in products liability cases indicates that their concern for consumer
protection is greater than their concern for the ability of manufacturers to assess their
liabilities.

See generally COTCHETr & CARTwRiGHT, supra note 92, § 8.02; Thrailkill,

Statutes of Limitations: Their Selection and Application in Products Liability Cases, 23
VANn.L. REv. 775 (1970).
106. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
107. See note 41 and text accompanying notes 40-46 supra.
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though [he] has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale

of his product."'10 8 This principle, unlike the rules governing corporate
transactions, requires a manufacturer to assume the risk of injuries due

to defective products when he places them on the09 market regardless

of the reasonableness or care with which he does so.
The facts in Greenman restricted the imposition of strict liability to

a manufacturer. Since that decision, courts have applied the same
rationale to all members of the marketing chain. Strict liability for defective products was first extended to retailers, with Chief Justice Traynor's introduction of the concept of enterprise liability: "Retailers like
manufacturers are engaged in the business of distributing goods to the

public. They are an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries resulting from

defective products.""10 In addition to reiterating his cost-shifting
rationale for imposing liability, Justice Traynor further justified this expansion by remarking that in some cases the retailer may be the only
member of the marketing enterprise reasonably available to the injured
plaintiff."' It is interesting to note that in those instances where the

seller corporation dissolves, a purchaser of assets would likewise be the
only entity reasonably available to a plaintiff injured by the seller's de-

fective product. Recovery requires merely that the courts deem a purchaser of assets to be a member of the marketing enterprise. This, in
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2) (a) (1965); see note 106 supra.
109. Even though a plaintiff does not have to prove a breach of a duty of care under
the theory of strict liability, he does have to prove that he was injured by a defect
in the product and that the product was defective when it left the hands of the manufacturer. This requirement, given certain circumstances such as the plaintiff's inability
to identify the particular defect which caused the injury, may make it more profitable
to seek recovery under a negligence theory, especially, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
In this manner, he may avoid having to prove the existence of a defect in favor of
establishing an inference of negligence. See Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal.
3d 379, 483 P.2d 681, 93 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1971) (allowing alternative strict liability
and res ipsa loquitur jury instructions).
Since under a negligence theory the plaintiff must at least establish an inference of
a breach of duty on behalf of the defendant, problems arise when this theory is employed
to impose liability on a successor corporation for its predecessor's torts. Theoretically,
when a transferee of assets has no control over production and marketing, he has no
duty to insure the safety of the products manufactured.
For an interesting discussion of the creation of such a duty based on a transferee's
continuing to represent himself as the transferor in the same enterprise, see Note, Assumption of Products Liability, supra note 40, at 107-10; cf. Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332
F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
110. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262, 291 P.2d 168, 171, 37
Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (1964).
111. Id.
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turn, becomes more likely with each judicial extension of the theory
of enterprise liability.
Supported by the policy that the risk of injury can best be borne and
insured by the marketing enterprise and distributed among the public
as a cost of doing business, 112 courts have expanded the scope of strict
liability beyond manufacturers and retailers to include such defendants
as wholesale-retail distributors, 113 real estate developers,'1 4 lessors of
real and personal property," 5 and trademark licensors.'" In 1977, the
ever lengthening reach of strict liability was extended to include purchasers of business assets."1
B.

JudicialRecognition of the Policy Conflict: California
ConsidersRejecting the CorporateRules
as Governing a Transferee'sLiability
for Defective Products

California's departure from corporate analysis as a means of determining the liability of an assets transferee for the defective products
of its transferor was preceded by three other decisions which handled
the conflict between corporate law and strict liability. In Shannon
v. Samuel Langston Co.,"18 a plaintiff was injured by a defective
machine after the manufacturing company had sold all its assets in
exchange for stock in the purchasing company and subsequently dissolved. The purchaser continued the business operations of the seller
without interruption. Noting the continuation of operations by the
transferee, the continuation of stockholder interest in the two corporations, and the extinction of the seller as a corporate entity shortly
after the sale, the court found that the parties to the transfer, unlike those in Kloderdanz v. Joy Manufacturing Co.," 9 were not
"strangers after the sale."' 20 The facts were sufficient to find a de
112. This risk-spreading policy espoused by Justice Traynor in his concurring opinion
in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944),
was adopted by the California State Supreme Court in Seeley v. White Motor Co., 63
Cal. 2d 9, 18-19, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965).
113. Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306
(1968).
114. Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749
(1969).
115. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
116. Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972).
117. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
118. 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
119. 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968). See note 80 supra.
120. 379 F. Supp. at 801.
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facto merger, but the court went on to discuss "[tihe public policy
behind the evolving common law of products liability"12 which requires that the transferee, "having received the benefits of a going concern, should also assume the costs which all other going concerns must
ordinarily bear. ''" 22 These "costs" were the damages done by defective
products which can best be absorbed and distributed by the enter23
prise.1
In Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp.,"' a suit based on facts

very similar to those in Shannon, a federal court of appeals imposed
liability on a purchaser of business assets employing the de facto merger rationale. In supporting its finding, the court made it known that
an injured party's right to seek recovery was "to be resolved by an
analysis of public policy considerations rather than by a mere procrus,121 Public policy considerations
tean application of formalities .
entailed deciding who was better able to spread the burden of loss
through insurance. 26 The most obvious choice was the assets transferee.
To date, the most expansive of those cases which have employed
public policy considerations to bolster their corporate analyses of transferee liability has been Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.' 27 The court in Cyr
found a purchaser of all the assets of its predecessor liable for the
seller's torts through the application of the mere continuation exception
to the "general rule."' 28 What distinguishes this case from traditional
"continuation"e cases is the fact that while the purchaser continued the
business operations of the seller, it paid cash consideration, thereby
avoiding any implication of continuity of stockholder interest or ownership. Both of these interests were traditional elements of the exception.' 29 Therefore, a finding by the court of sufficient continuation to
impose liability based on the mere fact that the purchaser carried on
the business operations of the seller intact indicates a shift in emphasis
from continuation of corporate entity to simple continuation of enterprise. The risk allocation and loss distribution rationale underlying
*...

121. Id. at 802.
122. Id. Such benefits received from the going-concern included its expertise, reputation, and established customers.
123. Id.
124. 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975), noted in 6
SEToN HALL L. REV. 477 (1975).
125. Id. at 369.
126. Id. at 370.
127. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974), noted in 27 MAINE L. REV. 305 (1975).
128. Id. at 1154.
129. Id. at 1151. See notes 82-87 supra and accompanying text.
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strict enterprise liability was used to substantiate this obvious expansion
of the corporate rules governing transferee liability. The court explained:
The very existence of strict liability for manufacturers implies a basic
judgment that the hazards of predicting and insuring for risk from
defective products are better borne by the manufacturer than by the
consumer. The manufacturer's successor, carrying over the experience
and expertise of the manufacturer, is likewise in a better position
than the consumer to gauge the risks and the costs of meeting them.
The successor knows the product, is as able to calculate the risk of
defects as the predecessor, is in position to insure therefor and reflect
such cost in sale negotiations, and is the only entity capable of improving the quality of the product.13 0
Although this emphasis on the continuation of the seller's enterprise
rather than on the entity served only as a means by which the Cyr court
could impose liability on the purchaser by the application of corporate
law, it foreshadowed what was to become the basis for the rejection
of corporate law in such cases altogether.
In Ray v. Alad Corp., 3 ' the California Supreme Court was confronted with facts similar to those in Cyr. Plaintiff was seeking damages for injuries caused by an allegedly defective ladder manufactured
by what the court referred to as the "Alad I" corporation.1 1 2 A year
prior to the injury, Alad I sold, for adequate cash consideration, all
its manufacturing assets, including real estate, plant, offices, equipment,
trade name, inventory, and good will to "Alad II" before subsequently
dissolving. The contract for sale did not provide for Alad II to assume
any of its predecessor's liabilities for defective products.1 3 The court
had to decide whether Alad II, by reason of its continuing to "mainufacture the same line of ladders under the 'Alad' name, using the same
equipment, designs, and personnel, and soliciting Alad I's customers
through the same sales representatives with no outward indication of
any change in the ownership of the business,'1 4 inherited its predecessor's liability for defective products.
The court recognized that under the corporate "general rule," the
transaction between Alad I and Alad II could not constitute a continuation since there was adequate consideration running from the purchaser
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

501 F.2d at 1154.
19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
Id. at 24, 560 P.2d at 4-5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 575-76.
Id. at 26-27, 560 P.2d at 5-6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576-77.
Id. at 25, 560 P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
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to the seller, and there was no continuity of management or stockholder
interest.'3 5 Thus Alad II would not inherit any liability it did not
specifically assume. Under an analysis similar to that employed in
Cyr,'3 6 Alad II might have been deemed a continuation of Alad I's
enterprise and therefore subject to the "expanded version" of the continuation exception to the "general rule."' 3 7 The court in Ray, however,
chose to reject the Cyr approach in favor of imposing liability on Alad
II by means of an independent "special exception" to the "general rule"
called for by the policies underlying-strict liability in tort. 188
While expressly restricting its analysis to "the narrow circumstances
here presented,"' 39 the California Supreme Court based its rejection
of the corporate "general rule" in this case on three grounds. First, the
court recognized that the application of the corporate "general rule"
would virtually deprive the plaintiff of any adequate remedy against the
manufacturer of the product causing his injury. The injury had not
occurred until more than six months after Alad I had dissolved.' 40 The
court then buttressed its departure from corporate theory by utilizing
the risk allocation and cost distribution rationales espoused earlier by
former Chief Justice Traynor.' 4' The court reasoned that given Alad
II's successorship to all the resources and information enjoyed by Alad
I, the former "had virtually the same capacity as Alad I to estimate
the risks of claims for injuries from defects in previously manufactured
ladders for purposes of obtaining insurance coverage or planning selfinsurance.' 42 Furthermore, subsequent to the sale of assets "it was
Alad II, not Alad I, which was in a position to promote the 'paramount
policy' of the strict products liability rule by 'spreading throughout
society . . . the cost of compensating [otherwise defenseless victims
135. Id. at 29, 560 P.2d at 7, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 578. See Ortiz v. South Bend
Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1975); text accompanying notes 83-87
supra.
136. 501 F.2d 1145 (lst Cir. 1974).
137. See text accompanying notes 129-30 supra.
138. The court recognized the Cyr case as "helpful authority on the separate issue
of what if any special rule should be applicable to a successor corporation's tort liability
for its predecessor's defective products," but rejected any implication in Cyr "that the
settled rule governing a corporation's succession to its predecessor's liabilities generally
should be modified so as to require such succession merely because of the factors of
continuity present in Cyr and in the instant case." 19 Cal. 3d at 29-30, 560 P.2d
at 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
139. Id. at 25, 560 P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
140. Id. at 31-33, 560 P.2d at 9-10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580-81. See notes 45-54 supra
and accompanying text.
141. See note 95 supra, and text accompanying note 98 supra.
142. 19 Cal. 3d at 33, 560 P.2d at 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
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of manufacturing defects].' "143 What the court has in effect done, at
least within the confines of the particular facts of the case, is to impose
liability upon the business enterprise itself, rather than on any particular
entity. Finally, despite the fact that Alad II had exercised no control
over the defective product in question, the court felt that the imposition of liability would cause no injustice since Alad H had legitimately
and continually exploited the good will and established reputation of
its predecessor. 144 This exploitation and continuation of its predecessor's product line constituted sufficient participation on the part of
Alad II in the ladder manufacturing enterprise to make it strictly liable
in tort for defective products manufactured by that enterprise.14 5 This
is a logical conclusion since the seller's previous business created the
present demand for the successor's products, and the successor's continuance of the enterprise could very well reinforce consumer reliance
on the safety of those products.
The Ray court restricted its holding to the narrow circumstances presented, i.e., where the successor corporation acquired its dissolved
predecessor's manufacturing business virtually intact and continued its
product line without change. The significance of the decision transcends its narrow facts, however, for it was the first case to substitute
the strict liability concept of enterprise for the corporate law concept
of entity as the primary consideration for determining the liability of
a corporate asset transferee for the torts of its transferor. Further utilization of this concept would virtually destroy the value of the "general rule"
as a shield against unassumed product liabilities.
Although this result conflicts with traditional corporate expectations,
the California Supreme Court decision is in total harmony with the spirit
of strict liability in tort as it has developed in California. What Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. did to the law of warranty, 148 the

court's opinion in Ray v. Alad Corp. may have done to the traditional
law governing corporate acquisitions. Both laws buffered the manu143. Id., (quoting Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251, 466 P.2d 722, 72526, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 181-82 (1970)).
144. 19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at 10-11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82. The Cyr court
expressed this same view when it said:
[Ilt is true that the successor, by definition was not the legal entity which
launched the product on the stream of commerce or made an implied representation
as to its safety. But in the most real sense it is profiting from an exploiting of
all the accumulated good will which the products have earned, both in its outward
representations of continuity and in its internal adherence to the same line of equipment.
501 F.2d at 1154.
145. 19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at 10-11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82.
146. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
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facturer from contingent liability for product-related claims, and both
fell to a public policy which favored the interests of consumers. Just
as Chief Justice Traynor remarked that "[tihe remedies of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend upon the intricacies of the law
of sales,' 47 so the court in Ray noted that those remedies ought not
to depend upon "the general rules of state law making succession to
the liabilities of an acquired going business dependent on the form and
circumstances of the acquisition ..

,14

Although the application of strict enterprise liability in the Ray case
was confined to a business transferee who continued its dissolved
predecessor's manufacturing business and product line virtually intact,
the potential scope of the doctrine has yet to be defined. For instance,
would a minor modification of the predecessor's product line or a
change of plant location be enough to cut off the successor's liability?
Indeed, what if the successor drastically changed the product line but
nevertheless continued to profit from its predecessor's former customers and good will?
Ray leaves a myriad of questions presently unanswered concerning
the scope of liability of corporate asset transferees. At some point the
interests favoring corporate acquisitions will appear to outweigh those
interests underlying the risk of loss theory in product-liability cases.
The courts will inevitably address these questions in the future, and any
potential litigant should be aware that they will most likely be addressed in the context of the fertile law of enterprise liability, susceptible to expansion at any time. It can be safely concluded, however,
that any corporation contemplating the acquisition of another's business,
by whatever means and for whatever purpose, should acquire products
liability insurance as an essential safeguard in the acquisition. 49
147. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
148. 19 Cal. 3d at 30, 560 P.2d at 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579. The court cited this
as being the approach taken by the United States Supreme Court when determining
whether an employer, after acquiring and continuing an ongoing business operation,
is bound by its predecessor's collective bargaining obligations imposed by federal labor
law. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 257-58 (1974) (successor employer not bound after acquiring only some assets and predecessor remained
in existence as a viable corporate entity); Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414
U.S. 168, 180-83 & n.5 (1973) (successor employer considered in privity with its predecessor after acquiring the employing enterprise with knowledge of an unfair labor practice); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549-51 (1964) (successor
employer bound after acquiring predecessor through merger, there being a substantial
continuity of identity in the business enterprise); Note, 27 MAINE L. REv. 305, 313-15
& n.40 (1975).
149. A number of precautionary arrangements may be made by an acquiring corn-
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CONCLUSION

The "general rule" that a transferee corporation does not, by reason
of its purchase of another's assets, assume the transferor's liabilities, was
promulgated to facilitate the bona fide purchase of business assets by
individual corporate entities. The rule itself allows the purchasing
entity to calculate precisely the extent of liability it will assume, while
the four exceptions to the general rule serve to insure the rights of
creditors and minority shareholders throughout the transaction.
Strict liability in tort-founded in tort, rather than commercial lawserves to insure the rights of injured persons to compensation from
those who market defective products. The policies underlying each of
these areas of the law are necessarily incompatible, and when the
spheres in which they operate overlap, as in products liability suits
against a purchaser of business assets, the courts have indicated a
willingness to apply the public policy supporting strict liability.
Charles L. Crouch

pany to offset the risk of any contingent liabilities. One of these is for the assets transferee to arrange for the continuation of the seller's products liability insurance, with
the consideration paid for the assets reflecting any premiums yet to be paid. See
Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 802 (W.D. Mich. 1974). Another
arrangement would be for the shareholders of the transferor to personally indemnify
the transferee against any contingent liabilities that the latter may incur. See Freling,
supra note 21, at 1131. Finally, it has been suggested that a portion of the consideration passing from the transferee to the transferor could be placed in escrow to indemnify
the transferee for contingent product liabilities. See Comment, Transferee Liability,
supra note 21, at 386. This last solution is often impractical, however, because there is
no way of determining the amount of time the consideration will be tied up. Similarly,
in those cases where the transferor wishes to liquidate and dissolve after the sale, the
full purchase price will be needed to satisfy the claims of creditors and shareholders.

